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Pursuant to the Rules of the Court of Appeals, 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 500.l(f),
Amici Curiae make the following disclosure:
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, the Anti-Defamation
League, Asian Americans Advancing Justice, the Asian American Bar Association
of New York, the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Hispanic
National Bar Association, LatinoJustice PRLDEF, Inc., the Metropolitan Black Bar
Association, the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., the National
Asian Pacific American Bar Association, the National Bar Association, the Society
of American Law Teachers, Inc., and the South Asian Bar Association of North
America are not-for-profit organizations with no parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates.
The National Native American Bar Association has an affiliate 501(c)(3) not-forprofit charitable arm, the National Native American Bar Association Foundation,
but has no other parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates. The National Asian Pacific
American Woman’s Forum is fiscally sponsored by the Tides Center. The South
Asian Bar Association of New York has an affiliate 501(c)(3) not-for-profit
charitable arm, the South Asian Bar Association of New York Fund, Inc., but has
no other parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates.
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae—bar associations, advocacy organizations, and professors of
law specializing in American legal history, constitutional law, criminal law and
procedure, civil rights, capital punishment, and race, gender and discrimination—
submit this brief in support of Defendant Joseph Bridgeforth’s appeal from the
Second Department, which held that Defendant failed to establish a prima facie
violation under Batson v. Kentucky when he asserted that the prosecutor struck a
prospective juror based on her dark skin color. 119 A.D.3d 600, 601. Drawing
from their collective experiences, amici recognize that color discrimination inflicts
lasting harms both on our justice system and on society as a whole. Accordingly,
amici have a strong interest in ensuring that courts eradicate color discrimination
from the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes, and, where an inference of such
discrimination exists, that courts require the prosecutor to provide a neutral
explanation for the strike.
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (“Korematsu Center”)
is a non-profit organization based at the Seattle University School of Law. The
Korematsu Center works to advance justice through research, advocacy, and
education. Inspired by the legacy of Fred Korematsu, who defied military orders
during World War II that ultimately led to the unlawful incarceration of 110,000
Japanese Americans, the Korematsu Center works to advance social justice for all.
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It has a special interest in promoting fairness in the courts of our country. That
interest includes ensuring that effective remedies exist to address implicit and
explicit bias in the courtroom. The Korematsu Center also works to understand
and remedy the race and color-based inequality that plagues our criminal justice
system, including during jury selection. The Korematsu Center does not, in this
brief or otherwise, represent the official views of Seattle University.
The Anti-Defamation League (“ADL”) was founded in 1913 to combat antiSemitism and all forms of bigotry, to defend democratic ideals, and to secure
justice and fair treatment to all. ADL is vitally interested in protecting the civil
rights of all persons and ensuring that each individual receives equal treatment
under the law regardless of race, color, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation,
or gender identity. Consistent with its mission, ADL is committed to working to
eliminate bias in the criminal justice system.
Asian Americans Advancing Justice (“Advancing Justice”) is a national
affiliation of five independent nonprofit, nonpartisan organizations: Asian
Americans Advancing Justice | AAJC, Asian Americans Advancing Justice | Asian
Law Caucus, Asian Americans Advancing Justice | Chicago, Asian Americans
Advancing Justice | Los Angeles, and Asian Americans Advancing Justice | Atlanta.
Through litigation, direct legal services, policy advocacy, community outreach and
education, and organizing, Advancing Justice seeks to promote a fair and equitable
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society for all by working for civil and human rights and empowering Asian
Americans and Pacific Islanders and other underserved communities. Members of
Advancing Justice strongly believe that our legal institutions including our jury
system cannot operate legitimately unless we are vigilant in ensuring that they are
free from all forms of discrimination and reflect the racial and ethnic diversity in
our larger society.
The Asian American Bar Association of New York (“AABANY”) was
formed in 1989 as a not-for-profit corporation to represent the interests of New
York Asian-American attorneys, judges, law professors, legal professionals, legal
assistants, paralegals, and law students. The mission of AABANY is to improve
the study and practice of law, and the fair administration of justice for all by
ensuring the meaningful participation of Asian Americans in the legal profession.
The Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (“AALDEF”),
headquartered in New York City and founded in 1974, is a national organization
that protects and promotes the civil rights of Asian Americans. By combining
litigation, advocacy, education, and organizing, AALDEF works with Asian
American communities across the country to secure human rights for all.
Discrimination based on “color” in a Batson challenge is no different from the
parallel challenges based on race and national origin; all of these categories are
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unlawful under the equal protection clause. Asian Americans have suffered and
continue to suffer because of discrimination based on color.
The membership of amicus curiae the Hispanic National Bar Association
(“HNBA”) comprises thousands of Latino lawyers, law professors, law students,
legal professionals, state and federal judges, legislators, and bar affiliates across the
country. The HNBA supports Hispanic legal professionals and is committed to
advocacy on issues of importance to the 53 million people of Hispanic heritage
living in the United States. The HNBA regularly petitions Congress and the
Executive on behalf of all members of the communities it represents.
LatinoJustice PRLDEF, Inc. (“LatinoJustice”) is a national not-for-profit
civil rights organization that has defended the constitutional rights and equal
protection of all Latinos under the law. LatinoJustice’s continuing mission is to
promote the civic participation of the greater pan-Latino community in the United
States, to cultivate Latino community leaders, and to engage in and support law
reform litigation across the country addressing criminal justice, education,
employment, fair housing, immigrants’ rights, language rights, redistricting, and
voting rights. During its 44-year history, LatinoJustice has litigated numerous
cases in both state and federal courts challenging multiple forms of racial
discrimination including discriminatory policing and law enforcement practices.
LatinoJustice supports greater transparency and fairness in our justice system, and

5

judicial recognition that skin color-based racial discrimination is a constitutionally
cognizable group for Batson purposes.
The purpose of the Metropolitan Black Bar Association (“MBBA”) is to
provide a forum to advance diversity and inclusion in the legal community and
address legal issues affecting the citywide community. Specifically, MBBA
advances the progress and enhancement of lawyers, with a focus on Black lawyers
and lawyers of color, and building the pipeline of talent for future lawyers;
develops jurisprudence and promotes the ethical practice of law; partners with
legal societies, governmental agencies, lawyers of other nations, and the public in
general to advance its purpose; commits its time, talent, and resources to the
community; and will do any and all things necessary and proper for the
accomplishment of these purposes, to the same extent, and in the same manner as
permitted by law. Undergirding MBBA’s mission and activities is a fundamental
commitment to equality. The current state of the law does not promote equality of
treatment.
The NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. (“LDF”) is the
nation’s first and foremost civil rights law organization. Through litigation,
advocacy, public education, and outreach, LDF strives to secure equal justice under
the law for all Americans, and to break down barriers that prevent African
Americans from realizing their basic civil and human rights. LDF has long been
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concerned about the influence of race on the administration of the criminal justice
system in particular and with laws, policies, and practices that have a
disproportionate negative impact on communities of color, especially African
Americans. For example, LDF served as counsel of record in cases challenging
racial bias in the criminal justice system, including the racial make-up of juries,
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
(1972), and Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973); pioneered the affirmative
use of civil actions to end jury discrimination in Carter v. Jury Commission, 396
U.S. 320 (1970), and Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); and appeared as
amicus curiae in cases involving the use of race in peremptory challenges in
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005), Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322
(2003), Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (overruling
Swain).
The National Asian Pacific American Bar Association (“NAPABA”) is the
national association of Asian Pacific-American attorneys, judges, law professors,
and law students, representing the interests of nearly seventy-five state and local
Asian Pacific-American bar associations and nearly 50,000 attorneys who work in
solo practices, large firms, corporations, legal services organizations, nonprofit
organizations, law schools, and government agencies. Since its inception in 1988,
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NAPABA has served as the national voice for Asian Pacific Americans in the legal
profession and has promoted justice, equity, and opportunity for Asian Pacific
Americans.

In furtherance of its mission, NAPABA promotes a diverse and

inclusive legal system free of discrimination.
The National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum (“NAPAWF”) is
the only national, multi-issue Asian and Pacific Islander (AAPI) women’s
organization in the country.

NAPAWF’s mission is to build a movement to

advance social justice and human rights for AAPI women and girls.

Jury

participation is a privilege and responsibility extended to all citizens of the United
States. Any exclusion of AAPI individuals from juries sends the message to the
AAPI women and girls NAPAWF serves that they are not included nor represented
in our system of justice, and would have an adverse impact on the inclusion of
AAPI women in civic engagement.
The National Bar Association (“NBA”) is the largest and oldest association
of predominantly African-American attorneys and judges in the United States. The
NBA was founded in 1925 when there were only 1,000 African-American
attorneys in the entire country and when other national bar associations, such as the
American Bar Association, did not admit African-American attorneys. Throughout
its history, the NBA consistently has advocated on behalf of African Americans and
other minority populations regarding issues affecting the legal profession. The
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NBA represents approximately 66,000 lawyers, judges, law professors, and law
students, and it has over eighty affiliate chapters throughout the world.
The National Native American Bar Association (“NNABA”) is the oldest
and largest association of predominantly Native American attorneys in the United
States. Founded in 1973 when the first group of Native American attorneys was
entering the legal profession, NNABA represents the interests of approximately
2,700 Native American attorneys. NNABA’s core mission since its inception has
been to promote the development of Native American attorneys who share the
communal responsibility of advancing justice for Native Americans.
The Society of American Law Teachers, Inc. (“SALT”), founded in 1973, is
the largest independent membership organization of legal academics in the United
States.

SALT’s membership includes law professors, deans, librarians, and

administrators from law schools across the country. Virtually all active SALT
members hold full-time positions in legal education.
The South Asian Bar Association of New York (“SABANY”) is an
organization dedicated to the needs, concerns and interests of lawyers of South
Asian heritage and the South Asian community in the greater New York City area.
The South Asian Bar Association of North America (“SABA North
America”) is a voluntary bar organization that serves as an umbrella organization
to 26 chapters in the United States and Canada representing over 6,000 lawyers,
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judges, and law students. SABA North America is a recognized forum for the
professional growth and advancement for South Asian lawyers in North America
and seeks to safeguard the civil rights and liberties of the South Asian community
across the continent.
The amici professors of law are as follows:
• Deborah Ahrens is an Associate Professor of Law at Seattle University
School of Law.
• Deborah N. Archer is a Professor of Law, Co-Director of the Impact Center
for Public Interest Law, and Director of the Racial Justice Project at New
York Law School.
• John H. Blume is the Samuel F. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques,
Director of Clinical, Advocacy and Skills Programs, and Director of the
Death Penalty Project at Cornell Law School.
• Paulette M. Caldwell is a Professor of Law at New York University School
of Law.
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Excluding an individual from jury service based on the color of her skin
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal and New York Constitutions.
As set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, a prosecutor who has exercised a peremptory
strike potentially motivated by racial discrimination must provide, at a minimum, a
race-neutral explanation for the strike. 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
Here, the prosecutor failed to provide such an explanation when Defendant
challenged the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of a dark-skinned Indian woman
from the jury. 1 Notwithstanding this failure, the People argue that the strike was
appropriate because skin color, unlike race, is not a protected characteristic under
the federal and state Equal Protection Clauses, and because permitting Batson
1

The material facts underlying Defendant’s Batson challenge, including the color of the
stricken juror’s skin and the prosecutor’s failure to provide any explanation for striking this
juror, are not in dispute here. See generally A313-319.
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challenges based on skin color would be too difficult to administer. People’s Br. 810. Neither point is correct. Indeed, there is no question that Batson protects
against discrimination on the basis of both race and skin color. Moreover, given
the relatively low burden Batson places on a prosecutor, and the importance of
preventing the “stigma or dishonor” that accompanies a prosecutor’s use of the
“raw fact of skin color” to “determine the objectivity or qualifications of a juror,”
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991), Defendant was entitled to raise a Batson
challenge on the basis of skin color discrimination here.
This brief proceeds in three parts. First, the brief reiterates Batson’s purpose
in protecting against discriminatory peremptory strikes arising out of stereotypes
based on characteristics like race, gender, religion, or skin color. Importantly, once
a defendant has made a prima facie showing supporting an inference of
discrimination, the burden falls on the prosecutor to provide a neutral explanation
for the strike.
Second, the brief identifies substantial empirical research outlining the
historical and continued effects of color discrimination in society. The People’s
first argument—at its core, that Defendant overstates the reality of color-based
discrimination—is undercut by numerous academic studies documenting both the
stereotypes attached to darker skin and the resulting discrimination that darker-
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skinned individuals face in all facets of society. These harms are precisely those
that Batson seeks to guard against with respect to jury selection.
Finally, the brief addresses the People’s administrability concerns. The
People’s brief fails to acknowledge decades of precedent showing that courts have
been capable of analyzing color discrimination in the context of, inter alia,
employment, housing, and federal financial assistance. The People also overlook
the fact that race-based discrimination, which is undisputedly a Batson-protected
group, is itself difficult to define and carries similar administrability problems.
Indeed, the People’s entire administrability argument appears to mirror a similar
argument raised by the dissent in Batson itself, which the Batson Court flatly
rejected.

See Batson, 476 U.S. at 129-30 & n.10.

In any event, any

administrability concern can simply be addressed by a neutral explanation for the
strike. That the prosecutor failed to do so here does not mean, as the People would
have it, that the Court should tolerate color discrimination in jury selection
altogether.
ARGUMENT
I.

Batson and Its Progeny Seek to Prevent Prosecutors from Striking
Potential Jurors Based on Invidious Stereotypes
a. Batson held that a peremptory challenge “based on either the race of the

juror or the racial stereotypes held by the” prosecutor violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59
15

(1992); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. 2 In so holding, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the long-recognized principle that “[a] person’s race simply ‘is
unrelated to his fitness as a juror.’” Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (quoting Thiel v.
Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223-24 (1946)). Rather, a juror’s competence
to serve “ultimately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and
ability impartially to consider evidence presented at a trial.” Id.
The Supreme Court has also recognized that excluding prospective jurors
based on such stereotypes both demeans the individual juror’s dignity and
decreases public faith in the justice system as a whole. It has squarely rejected the
suggestion that “no particular stigma or dishonor results if a prosecutor uses the
raw fact of skin color to determine the objectivity or qualifications of a juror.”
Powers, 499 U.S. at 410 (emphasis added). To the contrary, “[s]triking individual
jurors on the assumption that they hold particular views simply because of” their
race or sex “is ‘practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of
their inferiority.’” J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 (1994)
(quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)).

2

See also N.Y. Const., Art. I, § 11 (“No person shall, because of race, color, creed, or
religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights[.]”).
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b. Batson’s familiar three-step inquiry provides a framework to root out
peremptory strikes based on such protected characteristics.3 Under Batson, “once
the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of ***
discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the
strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step two).” Purkett v.
Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995). If no explanation is tendered, the strike is
impermissible. People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 101, 109 (1995). “If a race-neutral
explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the
opponent of the strike has proved purposeful *** discrimination.” Purkett, 514
U.S. at 767.
Making out a prima facie case “is not intended to be onerous[.]” People v.
Hecker, 15 N.Y.3d 625, 651 (2010). A party objecting to a strike need only
“produc[e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that
discrimination has occurred,” rather than proving it more likely than not that a
strike was made with discriminatory intent. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162,
170 (2005). Moreover, once a challenge has been raised, the burden imposed on
the prosecution by moving from Step 1 (prima facie case) to Step 2 (explanation) is
3

In light of the inescapable tension between peremptory challenges and a commitment to
eradicating discrimination in jury selection, several members of the judiciary have called for
peremptory challenges to be abandoned, or at least reconsidered. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke,
545 U.S. 231, 272 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (collecting citations). Batson did not go that
far, whether or not it should have.
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minimal. When asked to explain a strike, “the reason offered by the prosecutor
*** need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause ***.” Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 362–63 (1991). But that is all the more reason why a nondiscriminatory explanation must be provided.
II.

Color Discrimination Presents Precisely the Harms that Batson and its
Progeny Aim to Prevent
Courts have extended Batson’s protections to discrimination based on sex,

ethnicity, and religion. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. 127 (sex); Hernandez, 500 U.S. 352
(ethnicity); United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 668 (2d Cir. 2003) (religion).
They have found similar protections rooted in state law. E.g., People v. Kern, 75
N.Y.2d 638, 650 (1990). And they have stressed, as did Batson, that even a single
discriminatory strike is intolerable. E.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747
(2016); People v. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d 263, 267 (1993) (“[T]he exclusion of even
one member of a group for racial reasons is abhorrent to a fair system of justice.”).
In each of these cases, as in Batson, a court held that an individual that was
part of a group “capable of being singled out for differential treatment” was
entitled, at a minimum, to a non-discriminatory explanation for a peremptory strike
under the Equal Protection Clause. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 (citing Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)). The simple question presented by this case is
whether a challenge on the basis of skin color is entitled to the same explanation
under Batson Step 1. As seen below, given the pervasive discrimination on the
18

basis of skin color that continues to affect every facet of society, the answer must
be “yes.”
A.

Darker-Skinned Individuals Have Continuously Been Stereotyped
as Less Qualified Than Lighter-Skinned Individuals Solely Based
on Skin Color

Ample research shows that American society makes “assumptions about a
person’s race, socioeconomic class, intelligence, and physical attractiveness” based
solely on that person’s skin color.4 These assumptions fall along a well-established
hierarchy: lighter skin is associated with positive traits, and darker skin is tied to
negative ones. As a result, lighter-skinned individuals are “treated by others as
though they are more competent than” darker-skinned individuals “though there is
no information conveyed by the status itself indicating competency.” 5 This, of
course, is exactly what Batson was intended to prevent in the jury selection
process.
For decades, researchers have found that lighter-colored skin—across
races—is

4

(2000).

associated

with

“good”

characteristics

like

“attractiveness,”6

Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 Duke L.J. 1487, 1499-1500

5

Michael Hughes & Bradley Hertel, The Significance of Color Remains: A Study of Life
Chances, Mate Selection, and Ethnic Consciousness Among Black Americans, 68 Soc. Forces
1105, 1116 (Univ. of N.C. Press June 1990).
6
Jennifer Hochschild & Vesla Weaver, The Skin Color Paradox and the American Racial
Order, 86 Soc. Forces 1, 1 (Univ. of N.C. Press Dec. 2007); Cynthia E. Nance, Colorable
Claims: The Continuing Significance of Color Under Title VII Forty Years After Its Passage, 26
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“intelligence,”7 “prosperity,” 8 “refinement,” 9 “civility,” 10 “virtue,” 11 “personal
charm,” 12 “social mobility,” 13 and “emotional stability.” 14 Darker-colored skin, by
contrast, calls to mind “bad” characteristics: “toughness,” 15 “meanness,”16
“indigence,” 17 “criminality,” 18 and “failings in moral character, intellectual
capacity and achievement drive.”19 One psychological study found, for example,
that “[d]ark skin evokes fears of criminality or sharper memories of a purportedly
criminal face.”20 And a real-world example of this unconscious association took
Berkeley J. Empl. & Labor L. 435, 446-459 (2005); Margaret Hunter, The Persistent Problem of
Colorism: Skin Tone, Status, and Inequality, Sociology Compass 237, 243 (2007).
7
Jones, supra note 4, at 1527; Nance, supra note 6, at 446-459; Lance Hannon, White
Colorism, 2 Soc. Currents 13, 17 (2015).
8
Jones, supra note 4, at 1527.
9
Id.
10
Hunter, supra note 6, at 243.
11
Id.
12
Nance, supra note 6, at 446-459.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 446 n.59 (citing Keith Maddox & Stephanie Gray, Cognitive Representations of
Black Americans: Reexploring the Role of Skin Tone, 28 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 250,
255 (2002)).
15
Id. at 1527.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Walter Allen, Edward Telles & Margaret Hunter, Skin Color, Income and Education: A
Comparison of African Americans and Mexican Americans, 12 Nat’l. J. Soc. 130, 132 (2000).
20
Hochschild & Weaver, supra note 6, at 5 (internal citations omitted). In one study,
researchers found that Black defendants with darker skin and other, more “stereotypically Black”
physical traits were more than twice as likely to be sentenced to death as lighter-skinned or less
stereotypically Black defendants. Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Paul G. Davies, Valerie J. PurdieVaughns & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black
Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 Psychol. Sci. 383, 385 (2006).
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place in 2015, when police officers in Madison, Alabama severely beat and injured
a fifty-seven-year-old Indian immigrant after a suspicious caller reported him to be
a “skinny Black guy.” 21 This incident obviously raises other intertwined issues of
policing and racial profiling, but aptly illustrates the lumping of dark-colored
individuals into a single class of “suspect” individuals based simply on their skin
color.
Studies have identified similar color-based stereotypes—lighter skin
“better”, darker skin “worse”—in Black,22 Latino,23 and Asian 24 communities.
Indeed, even as late as 1990, scholars were still testing—and debunking—the
theory that “the relationship between light skin and high socioeconomic status” is
because “those with light skin have more white ancestry and therefore more native
ability.”25
Researchers have also traced this persistent view—that a “fair complexion”
confers “a decided advantage” in society—across the course of American history.26
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Peter Holley, Abby Phillip & Abby Ohlheiser, Alabama Police Officer Arrested after
Indian Grandfather Left Partially Paralyzed, Wash. Post (Feb. 12, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/02/11/alabama-cops-leave-agrandfather-partially-paralyzed-after-frisk-goes-awry/.
22
Jones, supra note 4, at 1551; Nance, supra note 6, at 446-459.
23
Hannon, supra note 7, at 17.
24
Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism Among South Asians: Title VII and Skin Tone
Discrimination, 14 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 665, 671-674 (2015).
25
Hughes & Hertel, supra note 5, at 1115 (emphasis added).
26
Nance, supra note 6, at 441.
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In the post-Civil War era, for example, lighter-skinned Blacks created “separate
communities in which skin color served as the key to access.” 27 These included
“color-conscious congregation[s],” where membership was determined by whether
an individual’s skin color was lighter than a brown paper bag. 28 These also
included social clubs like the “Blue Vein Society of Nashville,” where entry was
determined on whether the “applicant’s skin color was light enough for the veins in
the wrist to be visible.”29 Similar skin-color litmus tests have been historically
used to determine the rights and privileges of individuals of other races and
ethnicities as well. To take one case, in United States v. Dolla, a South Asian
immigrant was granted citizenship, a privilege then-reserved for only “White”
immigrants, primarily on the ground that the “skin of his arm” was “sufficiently
transparent for the blue color of the veins to show very clearly.” 177 F. 101, 102
(5th Cir. 1910).
B.

Darker-Skinned Individuals Are Regularly Deprived of Benefits,
Rights, Privileges, and Opportunities Afforded to Lighter-Skinned
Individuals

Overt skin-color litmus tests, of course, are barred by the state and federal
Equal Protection Clauses. Nevertheless, negative attitudes and stereotypes against
darker-skinned individuals continue to manifest themselves as tangible harms
27

Jones, supra note 4, at 1515.
Id. at 1516.
29
Id. at 1515.
28
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across all aspects of society. One survey of African Americans found that “darkerskinned African Americans are twice as likely to report that they have been victims
of discrimination than those with lighter-skinned complexions.”30

Likewise,

“darker, more Indian-looking Mexican Americans also reported a significantly
greater amount of discrimination” than “lighter, more European-looking Mexican
Americans.” 31 Scholars have further observed that “[d]arker-skinned Asian groups
are widely considered to be at the bottom of the Asian American social
hierarchy.” 32 Below, amici outline just a few examples of the societal harms
imposed upon dark-skinned individuals by virtue of their skin color.33
1.

Employment

The United States government has itself acknowledged that darker-skinned
individuals are generally denied access to more prestigious and better-paying jobs

30

Leonard M. Baynes, If It’s Not Just Black and White Anymore, Why Does Darkness
Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness? An Investigation and Analysis of the
Color Hierarchy, 75 Denv. U.L. Rev. 131, 133-134 (1997).
31
Id. at 134.
32
Kim D. Chanbonpin, Between Black and White: The Coloring of Asian Americans, 14
Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 637, 644 (2015).
33
Batson does not require proof that a struck venireperson belongs to a “group” with a
“common thread of attitudes, ideas or experiences.” Contra People Br. 33. Indeed, it makes no
sense to hold that Batson—a doctrine aimed at eliminating the role of invidious stereotypes in
jury selection—only applies if an objector can stereotype a “cognizable group” as having
“common” attitudes, ideas or experiences. Cf. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)
(rejecting perception “that members of the same racial group *** think alike” as an
“impermissible racial stereotype[]”). But to the extent that the People’s argument is premised on
a belief that some threshold shared experience of discrimination is required, this section should
be answer enough.
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based on their skin color.

In 1995, the Federal Glass Ceiling Commission

(“FGCC”) conducted a study of “opportunities for, and artificial barriers to, the
advancement of minority men and all women into management and
decisionmaking positions” in American businesses. 34 Among other things, the
study concluded that “our society has developed an extremely sophisticated, and
often denied, acceptability index based on gradations in skin color.” 35
The FGCC’s findings have been borne out by numerous empirical studies.
Lighter-skinned Blacks, for example, are paid more, hold more desirable jobs, and
generally have a “higher socioeconomic status” than darker-skinned Blacks.36
Even after controlling for socioeconomic backgrounds at birth, studies find that
individuals with lighter skin have “greater education, occupational prestige,
personal income, and family income than those with darker skin.” 37 As a result,
lighter-skinned Blacks were “more likely to be employed as professional and
technical workers” than darker-skinned Blacks, who “were more likely to be
employed as laborers.” 38 Indeed, one study, in trying to quantify the additional
value society awards to lighter-colored skin, found that dark-skinned Blacks earned
34

Federal Glass Ceiling Commission, Good for Business: Making Full Use of the
Nation’s Human Capital, 3 (1995).
35
Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
36
Nance, supra note 6, at 443.
37
Hughes & Hertel, supra note 5, at 1109 (emphasis added).
38
Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1705,
1719 (2000).

24

“seventy cents for every dollar earned by a light-skinned black.” 39 Another study
concluded that, although Blacks as a whole earned lower mean hourly wages than
Whites, light-skinned Blacks earned 8.6% less; dark-skinned Blacks, by contrast,
earned 26.4% less.40
Similar studies show that darker-skinned Latinos—generally those with
mixed African or Native American ancestry—have “lower socioeconomic status,”
“lower earnings,” and “less schooling” than “their lighter skinned, Europeanlooking counterparts.” 41 A 2003 study, for example, found that “[w]hite Latinos
*** had lower unemployment rates and lower poverty rates than black Latinos.”42
Other studies have found that darker-skinned Hispanics and Latinos receive
“significantly lower earnings” 43 and “significantly lower occupational prestige
scores” 44 than their lighter-skinned counterparts.
Studies of Asian Americans reach similar conclusions. In Hawai’i, “lightskinned East Asian groups” are “overrepresented in white-collar industries,” while
“[d]ark-skinned Asian Americans, including Pacific Islanders, are overrepresented
39

Nance, supra note 6, at 443.
Arthur H. Goldsmith, Darrick Hamilton & William Darity Jr., From Dark to Light, 42
J. Hum. Res. 701, 717 (2007).
41
Christina Gomez, The Continual Significance of Skin Color: An Exploratory Study of
Latinos in the Northeast, 22 Hisp. J. Behav. Sci. 94, 95 (2000).
42
Id.
43
Id.; see also Hunter, supra note 6, at 243 (2007).
44
Rodolfo Espino & Michael M. Franz, Latino Phenotypic Discrimination Revisited: The
Impact of Skin Color on Occupational Status, 83 Soc. Sci. Q. 612, 612 (2002).
40
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in low-wage blue-collar industries.”45 More generally, researchers have found that
society associates “lighter-skinned” Asian Americans—e.g., those with Chinese,
Japanese, or Korean ancestry—with “socioeconomically privileged groups,” and
“darker-skinned” Asian Americans—e.g., those with Hmong, Cambodian or
Laotian ancestry—with “socioeconomically disadvantaged groups.” 46
2.

Education

Darker-skinned individuals are also deprived of educational opportunities
based on their skin color, such as where they go to school, how long they go to
school, and how they are treated once at school.

Multiple studies have

demonstrated this “learning and earnings penalty” imposed on those with darker
skin. 47
Researchers have determined, for example, that the “education gap between
light-skinned blacks and dark-skinned blacks” is “nearly identical” to the
“education gap between whites and blacks.” 48

“Darker skinned children,” in

addition, “are much more likely to be disciplined” than their lighter-skinned

45

Chanbonpin, supra note 32, at 645.
Id. at 655.
47
Allen, Telles & Hunter, supra note 19, at 168. Discrimination on the basis of skin color
further affects “housing access, ownership, and segregation,” all factors that contribute towards
the quality of education received. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 6, at 242.
48
Id. at 243.
46
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classmates.49 In one study, darker-skinned Black female students were found to be
“about three times more likely to be suspended at school than their light-skinned
counterparts.”50
Similarly, “Latinos with dark skin are significantly less likely to graduate
from high school and go to college than those with light skin.” 51 Researchers
found in one analysis that “lighter-skinned Mexican Americans complete more
years of schooling than darker-skinned Mexican Americans even when their family
backgrounds are similar.”52 In another, light-skinned Mexican Americans were
found to have had about 1.5 more years of schooling than darker-skinned
Chicanos. 53
In a third line of studies, researchers have found that “lighter complexion
among Asian American young adults of both sexes is associated with higher
educational attainment.” 54

Asian-American men with white skin “are

approximately 2.4 times likely to hold a Bachelor’s degree than those with light

49

Kimberly Jade Norwood, “If You Is White, You’s Alright….” Stories About Colorism in
America, 14 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 585, 593 (2015).
50
Hannon, supra note 7, at 15.
51
Igor Ryabov & Franklin W. Goza, Phenotyping and Adolescence-to-Adulthood
Transitions Among Latinos, 6 Race Soc. Probs. 342, 353 (2014).
52
Hunter, supra note 6, at 243.
53
Gomez, supra note 41, at 96.
54
Igor Ryabov, Colorism and Educational Outcomes of Asian Americans: Evidence from
the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, 19 Soc. Psychol. Educ. 303, 321 (June
2016).
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brown skin.”55 And despite the prevalence of the “model minority myth” of Asian
Americans as universally well-educated high achievers, high school graduation
rates of darker-skinned Southeast Asians “approximate those of Hispanics, the
lowest among the US major minority groups.”56
3.

Politics

In the political arena, lighter-skinned individuals also enjoy advantages over
darker-skinned individuals as well. For example, in an analysis of all AfricanAmerican officials elected to the House of Representatives, Senate or a governor’s
office since 1865, one study found that “light-skinned blacks have always been
considerably

overrepresented

and

dark-skinned

blacks

dramatically

underrepresented as elected officials.” 57 Similarly, in an experimental study to
assess the effect of skin color on voting preferences, a hypothetical darker-skinned
Black candidate “was evaluated much more harshly than his lighter-skinned peer”
by prospective voters. 58 Even when all other objective qualifications had been kept
equal, after the hypothetical vote was tallied, the researcher found that the lighter-

55

Id. at 316.
Id. at 307.
57
Hochschild & Weaver, supra note 6, at 8; Nor is this data skewed by historical
preferences. Another study noted that “since the 1960s, most Blacks elected or appointed to
prominent governmental positions have had light skin.” Jones, supra note 4, at 1520.
58
Nayda Terkildson, When White Voters Evaluate Black Candidates: The Processing
Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice, and Self-Monitoring, 37 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1032,
1048 (1993).
56
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skinned candidate had “prevailed over his darker opponent by an astonishing 18
percentage points.” 59
Real-world examples of this preference for lighter skin can easily be found.
During the 2008 Presidential election, for example, Senator Harry Reid was
reported to have privately stated his belief that the United States was ready to
embrace a black presidential candidate like then-Senator Barack Obama—“a lightskinned” African American “with no Negro dialect, unless he wanted to have
one.” 60 The benefits conferred by lighter skin color, too, were at the center of a
controversy involving then-Governor of Louisiana Bobby Jindal, who is IndianAmerican, when he displayed a commissioned portrait of himself with a lightened
skin tone in the Louisiana State Capitol, as well as a controversy involving South
Carolina Governor Nikki Haley, another Indian-American, concerning her selfidentification as “White” on her 2001 voter registration. 61
Darker-skinned individuals, by contrast, continue to face outright
discrimination in politics, including by being attacked with the same epithets

59

Hochschild & Weaver, supra note 6, at 10 (emphasis added).
Trina Jones, Intra-Group Preferencing: Proving Skin Color and Identity Performance
Discrimination, 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 657, 657 (2010) (internal citation omitted).
61
Vinay Harpalani, To Be White, Black, or Brown? South Asian Americans and the
Race-Color Distinction, 14 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 609, 623-24 (2015).
60
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historically used against Blacks.62 For example, in 1965, Indian Prime Minister
Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Mohammed Ayub Khan were
scheduled to visit the United States.

However, after both leaders expressed

opposition to the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson cancelled their visits,
remarking: “[a]fter all, what would Jim Eastland [the conservative Senator from
Mississippi] say if I brought those two n****** over here.” 63

To this day,

Professor Bandana Purkayastha notes that this epithet continues to be directed at
South Asian Americans.
Another, more-recent incident occurred in 2006, during the campaign of
former Virginia Senator George Allen. S.R. Sidarth, a twenty-year old campaign
volunteer for Allen’s Democratic opponent, Jim Webb, was assigned to track and
videotape Allen’s rallies across the state of Virginia. At one rally, Allen referred
to Sidarth, who is a relatively dark-skinned Indian-American, by stating: “Let’s
give a welcome to Macaca, here. Welcome to America and the real world of
Virginia.”64 Sidarth was the only non-White person at the rally and caught the
incident on videotape. Videotape of this incident spread quickly and widely on
62

See, e.g., Bandana Purkayasatha, Negotiating Ethnicity: Second-Generation South
Asian Americans Traverse A Transnational World, 29 (Rutgers Univ. Press 2005) (discussing the
experience of a South Asian medical student who was called the n-word as a child).
63
Richard N. Goodwin, President Lyndon Johnson: The War Within, N.Y. Times (Aug.
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YouTube, and media soon reported that “macaca” referred to macaques—a species
of monkey—and was considered an anti-Black racial epithet in French-speaking
countries.65
4.

Dating, Marriage, and Adoption

Color bias also affects the realm of personal choice.

Research has

demonstrated that preferences in dating, marriage, and adoption largely skew in
favor of lighter-skinned over darker-skinned individuals across all races. These
preferences cut across all communities; “[g]iven the opportunity, many people will
. . . choose to marry a lighter-skinned woman rather than a darker-skinned
woman.” 66 In Asian-American communities in particular, “differences in skin
color frequently determine social standing and marriageability.” 67 For many in
these communities, “[d]ark skin tone is *** associated with poverty and
‘backwardness.’” 68 And when families seek to adopt children, “the data suggest
there is a preference for light skin and biracial children over dark-skinned
children.”69
One of the more dramatic effects of these shared preferences for lighterskinned romantic partners is the prevalent practice of “skin bleaching,” i.e., the use
65

The Un-American Senator, L.A. Times (Aug. 21, 2006).
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of chemical products to physically lighten one’s own skin color. This practice has
been traced to communities all over the world, from East Asia to India to the
Middle East to Africa to Europe and to Canada.70 And this practice is found here
in the United States as well, as researchers have noted the popularity of
“[a]dvertisements for skin bleach or fade crème” that continue to appear in
numerous “national magazines aimed at black readers.” 71
5.

Pop Culture

Finally, the practice of privileging lighter-skinned over darker-skinned
individuals of a particular race is most visible in—and is likely reinforced by—
popular culture. Across races, “[i]nstitutions ranging from advertising agencies to
filmmakers to adoption agencies reinforce the dominant view that lighter is
better.”72
For example, “[b]lack women who play romantic leads in major Hollywood
films tend to have lighter skin and longer hair.”73 To take a specific example of
this type of color discrimination, earlier this year, controversy erupted over the
70
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casting of a lighter-skinned African-American actor, Zoe Saldana, to play a darkerskinned African American, Nina Simone, with many critics focused on whether
Ms. Saldana was cast because “she, unlike Simone, is light skinned and therefore a
more palatable choice for the Hollywood film than a darker skinned actress.”74
Further controversy arose when it was announced that Ms. Saldana would “don[]
make-up to appear darker for the film.” 75 As The Atlantic’s Ta-Nehisi Coates
noted, “Why do this if color is irrelevant? It is not any critic nor interlocutor who
is asserting that Zoe Saldana isn’t ‘black enough.’ It is the film-makers who made
that determination and then—in the most literal and crudest sense—decided to
make Saldana blacker.” 76
Lighter-skinned Blacks are also more likely to be found on television “as
news anchors, as cast members in television shows, as dancers and love interests in
music videos and as models in commercials.”77 Indeed, “even today, it is rare to
find a dark-skinned woman in a positive leading role or as a love interest.” 78 In
Latin-American telenovelas, too, “almost all of the actors look white, unless they
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are the maids and are then light brown.”79 Similarly, “[l]ighter-skinned women . . .
predominate among successful Black contestants in beauty pageants and in music
videos. They are also more likely than darker Blacks to be selected to endorse
mainstream commercial products.”80
***
In sum, darker-skinned individuals, both within and across races, continue to
experience discrimination in all facets of society based solely on the “raw fact of
skin color.” See Powers, 499 U.S. at 410. Thus, in carrying out Batson’s promise
to protect against invidious discrimination against groups “capable of being singled
out for differential treatment,” this Court should require, at a minimum, a nondiscriminatory explanation from the prosecutor as to why he struck a dark-skinned
individual from jury service.
III.

The People’s Administrability Concerns Lack Merit
The People further argue—remarkably—that Defendant’s Batson challenge

should be rejected because claims of color discrimination would be too difficult to
be administered by a court. But, the People are wrong. Administrability concerns
do not and cannot override the guarantees of equal protection in jury selection that
Batson promised.

79
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three reasons.

First, courts are perfectly well suited to analyze color-based

discrimination claims, having done so under statutes recognizing such claims since
the 1800s. Second, the administrability of color is no more difficult than the
administrability of race, which is indisputably a Batson “cognizable group.” And
third, to the extent any legitimate concern about administrability actually exists,
the impact is minimal; as discussed in Section I above, all a successful prima facie
case of color discrimination does is require the prosecutor to provide some nondiscriminatory rationale for the peremptory strike.
A.

Courts Are Well-Equipped to Identify Discrimination on the Basis
of Skin Color

Courts have reviewed and recognized claims of color discrimination based on
statutory regimes from as far back as the 1800s, including, among others, the 1866
Civil Rights Act, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the Fair Housing Act.81 As such,
there is no reason to believe—and the People offer none—that a court is somehow
ill-equipped to do the same under a Batson challenge. Indeed, a trial court’s job in
administering a claim of color discrimination in a Batson challenge is far easier
than in the cases cited below, since in a Batson challenge, the court can
81
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immediately see for itself whether the prosecutor has preferred lighter-skinned
individuals to darker-skinned ones, instead of relying on a plaintiff’s allegations
and the witnesses that are available for trial.
1.

1866 Civil Rights Act

Section 1981 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act was intended to prohibit
“discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875) (emphasis added). Courts,
accordingly, have repeatedly held that Section 1981 encompasses claims of color
discrimination. For example:
•

In Vigil v. City of Denver, the court held that a Mexican-American
could assert a Section 1981 claim of color discrimination against his
employer, holding that “Mexican-Americans are subject to color-based
discrimination, and are within the coverage of § 1981.” No. 77-F-197,
1977 WL 41, at *2 (D. Colo. May 23, 1977).

•

Likewise, in Jordan v. Whelan Security of Illinois, Inc., the court,
holding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Saint Francis College v.
Al–Khazraji 82 “compels the conclusion that § 1981 encompasses

82

In Al-Khazraji, the Supreme Court held that allegations that a white employer
discriminated against an Iraqi-American employee constituted racial discrimination, though
Arabs were classified as white, because § 1981 protected against discrimination based on
“ancestry or ethnic characteristics.” 481 U.S. 603, 613 (1987).
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claims of color discrimination,” recognized an African-American’s
Section 1981 claim of color discrimination against her employer. 30
F. Supp. 3d 746, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (emphasis added).
2.

1964 Civil Rights Act

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act also forbids employers from
discriminating on the basis of an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (emphasis added). The legislative history of the
section confirms what the text makes clear: Congress intended to eradicate both
race and color discrimination.83

The Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission’s interpretation of the statute likewise states that “[e]ven though race
and color overlap, they are not synonymous. *** Although Title VII does not define
‘color,’ the courts and the Commission read ‘color’ to have its commonly
understood meaning – pigmentation, complexion, or skin shade or tone.”84 Here,
too, courts have adjudicated numerous claims of color discrimination:
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•

In Walker v. IRS, the court recognized a claim for color discrimination
under Title VII between an African-American employee and AfricanAmerican employer, holding that “‘race’ is to mean ‘race,’ and ‘color’
is to mean ‘color.’” 713 F. Supp. 403, 406 (N.D. Ga. 1989).

•

In Felix v. Marquez, the court recognized a claim for color
discrimination under Title VII filed by a mixed-race Puerto Rican
woman, and noted that, “considering the mixture of races and ancestral
national origins in Puerto Rico, color may be the most practical claim
to present.” No. 78-2314, 1980 WL 242, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 1980)
(emphasis added).

•

In Arrocha v. City University of New York, the court held that a
Mexican plaintiff’s allegation “that light-skinned Hispanics were
favored over dark-skinned Hispanics” in hiring asserted a prima facie
claim of color discrimination under Title VII. No. CV021868, 2004
WL 594981, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004).

•

And in numerous cases, courts have dismissed claims for color
discrimination on the ground that, by solely asserting an administrative
claim on the basis of race, and not on the basis of color, the plaintiff
failed to exhaust his or her administrative remedies, because race and
color comprise two distinct claims under Title VII. See, e.g., Bryant v.
38

Bell Atl. Maryland, Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 133 n.5 (4th Cir. 2002); Gill v.
Bank of Am. Corp., 15-cv-319, 2015 WL 4349935, at *4 (M.D. Fla.
July 14, 2015); Hunter v. Texas Energy Servs. LP, 14-cv-142, 2014 WL
5426454, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2014).
Other sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act also recognize independent
claims of color discrimination, and courts are responsible for administering these
claims as well. See, e.g., Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“Title VI, like Title VII, forbids discrimination on the basis of ‘color’ as well as on
the basis of ‘race.’”); Felix v. Marquez, No. 78-2314, 1981 WL 275, at *11 (D.D.C.
Mar. 26, 1981) (“Discrimination on account of color is expressly forbidden by the
1964 Civil Rights Act, not only in Title VII (employment), but also in Titles II
(public accommodations), III (public facilities), IV (public education), VI
(federally assisted programs), VIII (voting) and IX (community relations
services)”) (emphasis added).
3.

Section 1982 and the Fair Housing Act

In Rodriguez v. Gattuso, the court awarded damages to a Latino couple
consisting of a dark-skinned husband and a light-skinned wife on their color
discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and the Fair Housing Act. 795 F.
Supp. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992). There, a prospective landlord separately rejected the
husband but permitted the wife to view an apartment. Id. at 865. In ruling for the
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plaintiffs, the court held, “someone who is of the same race *** but who is treated
differently because of his dark skin has been discriminated against because of his
color.” Id. (emphasis in original).
***
In light of all the other legal contexts in which courts already analyze color
discrimination, the People’s administrability concerns should be rejected on this
ground alone.
B.

Color Is No Less Administrable a Category Than Race Under
Batson

The People’s administrability concerns should further be rejected given that
race—which the People do not dispute is a Batson-protected classification—
presents just as many administrability challenges as does skin color. Neither the
Fourteenth Amendment, nor Batson, nor any of the statutes referenced above
provides an authoritative definition of “race” for guidance. In grappling with the
“enduring confusion” of defining and administering racial categories, see Vill. of
Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 603 (2d Cir. 2016), courts over the years have
tried out a broad range of proxies for race without settling on a single consensus
definition,85 including ethnicity, 86 ancestry, 87 national origin,88 distinctive
85

Contra People’s Br. at 64. The challenges in administering race can be vividly seen in
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“physiognomy,” 89 cultural characteristics, 90 and common perception.91 Indeed, the
People’s argument that race is administrable but color would be too hard to
administer ironically echoes the argument raised by Chief Justice Burger’s dissent
in Batson itself, which raised the concern that making a record of jurors’ races
would prove difficult. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 129-30 & n.10.
Despite Chief Justice Burger’s concerns, and the challenges raised above,
courts continue to apply the three-step Batson framework to race-based challenges
to prosecutors’ peremptory strikes. E.g., Rico v. Leftridge-Byrd, 340 F.3d 178, 183
(3d Cir. 2003) (Applying Batson in a race-based challenge even while asking,
“[H]ow does one define the ‘cognizable racial group’ to which Batson itself
referred? And how does one define ‘race’ when the understanding of ‘race’ itself

had held that “Caucasian” and “White” were synonymous terms. 261 U.S. 204 (1923).
Compare Thind, 261 U.S. at 209 with Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922). Then,
in the 1970s, the U.S. Census again abruptly designated South Asians as “White,” precluding
South Asians from receiving the protections of civil rights legislation passed during the 1960s.
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and twentieth centuries).
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has changed over the centuries?”). There is no reason why color-based challenges
cannot be similarly addressed as well.
C.

Any Administrability Concern Has Minimal Impact Given That
the Prosecutor Can Simply Provide a Race-Neutral Explanation
for the Strike.

In short, the People’s administrability concerns do not, and cannot, trump
the constitutional imperative of eradicating invidious color-based discrimination in
jury selection. But even assuming arguendo that some unique administrability
concern exists with respect to a color-discrimination claim that interferes with an
appellate court’s ability to later review the record, any such concern should be
minimized by Batson’s three-step inquiry. See supra Section I. Again, all that is
needed, upon the making of a prima facie case, is a simple non-discriminatory
explanation from the prosecutor. Cf. Rico, 340 F.3d at 183–84 (“Most trial courts,
it appears, fairly quickly learned to avoid having to determine the extraordinarily
difficult question of when and where to draw the line. Rather, most courts simply
assumed without deciding that Batson [applies] and then went on to dispose of the
Batson issue, most often by finding that the prosecutor had (or had not) offered a
race-neutral explanation for a strike sufficient to rebut a defendant’s prima facie
case.”).
Given this minimal burden on the People, the solution to any such
administrative or record-building difficulty is not to tolerate peremptory strikes
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based on race, sex, ethnicity, religion, or color. It is to review “a trial court’s
ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent” with deference, Snyder v. Louisiana,
552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008), and abide by the principle that the burden of making a
record falls to the appellant. Of course, if “meaningful appellate review” proves
“impossible” in a particular case (People’s Br. 68), the decision below will be
affirmed, or the case remanded for further factual development. But where the
claim of discrimination can be understood—because, for example, there is no
dispute that certain venirepersons have darker skin than others—nothing more
should be required, and appellate review should occur. Cf. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at
247 (“None of our cases announces a rule that no comparison is probative unless
the situation of the individuals compared is identical in all respects, and there is no
reason to accept one.”).
Review is possible here. Below, defense counsel clearly explained that
“[t]he district attorney has now preempted all the female black women,” including
“[t]he black or dark-colored” potential jurors.

A313 (emphasis added).

The

prosecution’s response was not, “which women?” or “I don’t think these women
were all dark-colored”; it was, “can’t do black or skin color, Judge. But I have
reasons for everybody.” A313. Before this Court, the People concede that the
prosecutor “never gave a reason” for striking the venireperson at issue in this
appeal (People’s Br. 2), and do not dispute that “if the prosecutor offers no
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explanation [at Step 2], the defendant has succeeded in meeting the ultimate
burden of establishing an equal protection violation.” Allen, 86 N.Y.2d at 109.
This case thus squarely presents the question whether a claim of
discrimination based on skin color can ever shift the Batson inquiry from Step 1
(prima facie case) to Step 2. The Court is perfectly well-equipped to answer that
legal question.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and in light of the prosecutor’s failure to provide
any reason for the peremptory strike of the juror in question, the Court should hold
that the principles of Equal Protection under Batson were violated and order a new
trial.
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